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ETLICAL STANDARDS FOR FETAL
EXPERIMENTATION
MICHAEL M. MARTIN*
I. INTRODUCTIONM EDICAL experimentation involving prenatal or aborted human
subjects has become a matter of increasing controversy' as legal
abortion 2 has added to the number of subjects available for fetal
experimentation 3 and dissatisfaction in some quarters with "liberal"
abortion laws has prompted attempts to limit their effect by restricting
fetal research. 4 A number of states have adopted legislation regulating
such research5 and several bills prohibiting federal funding have been
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Professor Martin received
his B.A. and J.D. from the University of Iowa where he was Editor-in-Chief of the Iowa Law
Review, and a B. Litt. from Oxford University.
1. See, e.g., Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26 Stan.
L. Rev. 1191 (1974). See also Altman, Curbs on Fetal Research Impede Fight on Disease, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 20, 1974, at 11; Randal, Challenges To Fetal Research, Wash. Star-News, July 19,
1974, at A-1.
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), discussed in Byrn, An American Tragedy- The
Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 807 (1973); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973); 74 Colum. L. Rev. 237 (1974), 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 75 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
3. See Statement of Randy V. Engel, Director, U.S. Coalition for Life, in Hearings on the
Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 568 (1973) (hereinafter cited
as 1973 Hearings].
4. See Culliton, Grave-Robbing: The Charge against Four from Boston City Hospital, 186
Sci. 420, 421-22 (1974); Randal, supra note 1, at A-i, F-18; Rorvik, The Embryo Sweenstakes,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 16, 60.
5. A detailed discussion of the state statutes is included in Note, Fetal Experimentation:
Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26 Start. L. Rev. 1191, 1197-1203 (1974). The most
common statutes prohibit experimentation on any conceptus except to preserve or protect its life
or health. La- Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87.2 (Supp. 1974); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1574 (Supp.
1974); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 145, 421-22 (Supp. 1974); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-312 (Supp. 1973);
see ch. 421, [1974] Mass. Ann. Laws 257, amending Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 12 (prohibits,
inter alia, use of any live fetus, before or after expulsion, for experimentation; an exception is
made for studies while in utero which do not jeopardize the fetus' life or health, when the fetus is
not the subject of a planned abortion); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 34-23A-17 (Supp. 1974)
(experimentation on fetuses without written consent of "the woman" prohibited); cf. Cal. Health
& Safety Code § 25956 (West Supp. 1974) (experimentation on aborted fetus prohibited, except to
preserve or protect its life); Ind. Code § 35-1-58.5-6 (Supp. 1974) [Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-112 (Burns
Cum. Supp. 1974)] (experimentation on aborted fetus prohibited); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-4,161
(Supp. 1973) (unlawful to "sell, transfer, distribute, or give away" aborted fetus for experimenta-
tion; no prohibition stated against use for that purpose).
A second type requires that abortion procedures be used which will preserve the life of a viable
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introduced in Congress. 6 In 1974 Congress imposed a moratorium on
the use of federal funds for experimentation with human fetuses,
pending the adoption of standards on the matter by the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. 7 The standards finally adopted by the Commis-
sion will likely be influenced by the policy being developed by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") for the
protection of human subjects in HEW-supported biomedical research
and related activities. 8
The HEW's proposed regulations will be the focus of this Article.
Particular attention will be given to the question of how well they
fulfill their express purpose of ensuring that experiments with human
subjects "conform to appropriate ethical standards and relate to impor-
tant societal needs."9 The analysis to be employed is founded on the
fetus. Idaho Code § 18-608(3) (Cum Supp. 1974); Ind. Code § 35-1-58.5-7 (Supp. 1974) lInd. Ann.
Stat. § 10-113 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1974]; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1575 (Supp. 1974); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-7-310 (Supp. 1974).
A third type of statute restricts the research uses of fetal tissues after abortion. See Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 81-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Ind. Code § 35-1-58.5-6 (Supp. 1974) [Ind. Stat.
Ann. § 10-112 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1974)]. Other statutes expressly exclude fetal remains from the
prohibition against experimentation. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25956 (West Supp. 1974); see
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.422(3) (Supp. 1974) (permitting sale of cell culture line from non-living
human conceptus). See also Culliton, Grave-Robbing: The Charge against Four from Boston City
Hospital, 186 Sci. 420 (1974); Dykes & Czapek, Regulations and Legislation Concerning Abortus
Research, 229 J.A.M.A. 1303 (1974).
6. See, e.g., S. 2072, H.R. 6849, 7724, 7725, 7850, 8778, 8779, 8780, 9488, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1973). Federal funds are a major source of support for medical research. See Note, Fetal
Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1191 n.2 (1974);
Comment, Non-Therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24 Syracuse L. Rev.
1067 n.5 (1973).
7. National Research Act § 213, 88 Stat. 353 (1974). The Commission's report to the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare is due not later than four months from the first day of the first
month after all members of the Commission have taken office. Id. § 202(b), 88 Stat. 350. The
version of the Act originally approved by the House of Representatives included a complete ban
on federal funding of fetal experimentation. See 119 Cong. Rec. 4167-75 (daily ed. May 31, 1973)
8. U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Protection of Human Subjects, Proposed 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.301-10, 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974) [hereinafter cited by section as HEW Proposals.
Proposed regulations for the protection of human subjects, to be generally applicable to all HEW
grant-supported activity, were published October 9, 1973. HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 27882
(1973). After public comment and some amendment, those regulations became effective July 1,
1974, as 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.1-.22. HEW Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 18917 (1974). Proposals for
regulations governing research with subjects in special categories (children, fetuses and abortuses,
prisoners, and the mentally infirm) were first published November 16, 1973. HEW Proposals, 38
Fed. Reg. 31738 (1973). The proposals for all categories except children were revised and
resubmitted for public comment on August 23, 1974. HEW Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 30648 (1974).
See also HEW Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 37993 (1974) (amending the Preamble to the August 1974
draft). This Article is principally concerned with the November 1973 and August 1974 drafts.
9. HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.302, 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974).
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assumption that "appropriate ethical standards" for fetal research
should be consistent with the standards applied in situations having
similar consequences, such as compulsory medical treatment, organ
transplantation, and abortion. A comparison with the standards de-
veloped in those situations will suggest that the proposed HEW
regulations for fetal research do not fully achieve their ethical objec-
tive.
Definitions
The term "experiment," and its various forms, will be used herein to
refer to medical procedures which create a risk of physical invasion'0
of the subject additional to, or different in nature from, that created
by established and accepted procedures necessary to meet the subject's
needs." This definition encompasses both a non-standard procedure
utilized for diagnosis or therapy, and standard procedures (e.g., with-
drawing a blood sample for analysis) done for purposes other than
relieving the subject's malady or preventing his contracting a disease.
"Fetal experimentation" has been used to describe a number of
situations in which products of human conception are put at risk.
These situations may conveniently be categorized as in vitro, in utero,
and abortus experiments.1 2 In vitro experimentation involves de-
velopment of the conceptus' 3  when it is outside the human
10. Non-invasive research procedures (e.g., urinalysis, opthalmoscopic examination, EEG.
pressure pulse measurement) are not "experimental" by this definition However, even procedures
which do not create physical risks may raise ethical problems to the extent they have a
psychological or socal effect on the subject. For this reason, the HEW Proposals define "subject
at risk" to include physical, psychological, sociological, and other risks. HEW Proposals. 45
C.F.R. § 46.3(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 18917 (1974); see id., Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46 24(b). 38 Fed
Reg. 31746 (1973). See generally Altman, New Rules Spark Controversy Over Human Biologic
Materials, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1974, at 35, cols. 1-3. Since only physical risks are presently of
significance in fetal experimentation (and the applicable principles should be the same in any
case), the definition used herein is limited accordingly.
11. See HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.3(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 18917 (1974). Whether
procedures are "established and accepted" is necessarily a matter of professional judgment in light
of both national and local standards of practice. See U.S. Dept- of Health, Educ. & Welfare, The
Institutional Guide to DHEW Policy on Protection of Human Subjects 3 (undated), in 1973
Hearings, pt 2, at 534. Even established and accepted procedures may be experimental if
employed for purposes other than the strict interests of the subject. For example, it is experimen-
tal to assign a patient arbitrarily to one accepted therapeutic regimen in order to compare its
effectiveness with that of another which also is established and accepted. Any alteration of the
choice, scope, or timing of an established method in the interests of research is experimental
under this definition. Id. at 3-4, in 1973 Hearings, pt. 2, at 534-35. See also Visscher. The Two
Sides of the Coin in the Regulation of Experimental Medicine, 169 Annals N.Y Acad Sci. 319,
324 (1970). "Experimental," as used herein, does not mean "harmful." See HEW Proposals, 38
Fed. Reg. 31739 (1973).
12. See HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738 (1973).
13. A "conceptus" is "that produced as a result of conception; embryo." Stedman's Medical
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womb. ' 4 Research in this area is focused on the fertilization of a human
ovum in a laboratory culture and its subsequent implantation in the
uterus. I s The subject of in utero experimentation is a conceptus in the
womb, at any time from fertilization until its delivery (spontaneous or
induced) or death. 16 Recent in utero experimentation has included
studies regarding the diagnosis of genetic problems from amniotic fluid
samples, 17 the effects of drugs and vaccines on fetal and maternal
health, 18 and the immunological processes involved in pregnancy.' 9
An abortus is a whole conceptus exhibiting vital signs which is
expelled (either spontaneously or as a result of medical or surgical
intervention) from the uterus.2 0 However, if the aborted fetus has the
ability to survive outside the womb to the point where it can indepen-
Dictionary 276 (22d ed. 1972). See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.421(2) (Supp. 1974): " 'Human
conceptus' means any human organism, conceived either in the human body or produced In an
artificial environment other than the human body, from fertilization through the first 265 days
thereafter."
14. See HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.303(g), 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974);
Edwards, Control of Human Development, in Artificial Control of Reproduction 93-100, 148-49
(C. Austin & R. Short eds. 1972).
15. See HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31743 (1973). See generally Karp, Meanwhile the Mad
Scientist Created an Airborne Division ..., N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1974, at 31, col. 4; Rorvlk,
The Embryo Sweepstakes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 16.
16. The HEW Proposals define "fetus" as "the product of conception from the time of
implantation to the time of delivery." HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.303(d), 39 Fed.
Reg. 30653 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Amniotic Fluid (D. Fairweather & T. Eskes eds. 1973); Conference on
Antenatal Diagnosis (A. Dorfman ed. 1972); Nadler, Fetal Diagnosis Utilizing Amniotic Fluid
Cells, in Fetal Growth and Development 141 (H. Waisman & G. Kerr eds. 1970); Levin, Oxman,
Moore, Daniels & Scheer, Diagnosis of Congenital Rubella in Utero, 290 N. Eng. J. Med. 1187
(1974); Montagne, Hemolytic Disease of the Fetus, in Intra-Uterine Development 443 (A. Barnes
ed. 1968).
18. See, e.g., Edsall, Letter, 186 Sci. 195 (1974); Marx, Drugs during Pregnancy: Do They
Affect the Unborn Child?, 180 Sci. 174 (1973); Vaheri, Vesikari, Oker-Blum, Seppala, Parkman,
Veronelli & Robbins, Isolation of Attenuated Rubella-Vaccine Virus from Human Products of
Conception and Uterine Cervix, 286 N. Eng. J. Med. 1071 (1972).
19. See, e.g., J. Anderson, Nature's Transplant (1972); Immunology and Reproduction (R.
Edwards ed. 1969).
The Thalidomide tragedy of the early 1960s would be included within the category of in utero
experimentation, since it involved administration of a non-standard drug to pregnant women,
putting the fetuses at risk. See generally Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation, pts. 1-2, 4 at 1912-25 (Comm.
Print 1963).
20. See HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.303(f), 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974). The
term does not apply to the placenta, macerated fetal material, or cells, tissue, or organs from a
dead fetus. Id. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 3 (22d ed. 1972) defines "abortus" as: "The embryo
or product of conception that is lost in an abortion." Contra, Williams, Obstetrics 1026-27 (14th
ed. L. Hellman & J. Pritchard 1971): "[A]bortus is defined as a nonviable conceptus .... ;" see
Dykes & Czapek, Regulations and Legislation Concerning Abortus Research, 229 J.A.M.A. 1303,
1304 (1974) (discussion of abortus research deals mainly with fetal remains).
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dently maintain vital functions (especially circulation and respiration),
it is said to be "viable" and is treated as a premature infant. 2'
Non-viable abortuses have been used as subjects for investigations into
congenital infections and defects, 22 tissue and organ transplantation, 23
and improved techniques for the care of premature babies.24
II. THE HEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS
Two sets of regulations have been proposed by HEW. 25 Major
provisions relating to fetal experimentation contained in the first draft,
promulgated in November 1973, included:
(1) a prohibition against any research activity involving a nonvi-
able abortus which would prolong heart beat and respiration for
research purposes or terminate heartbeat and respiration; 26
21. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973); HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R.
46.303(e), 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974). See also, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87.2 (Supp. 1974)
(defining "live birth," for purpose of prohibiting experimentation, as complete extraction and any
evidence of life); M Iinn. Stat. Ann. § 145.421 (Supp. 1974) (defining "living conceptus," for
purpose of prohibiting experimentation, as including any human organism from fertilization to
265 days' gestation and evidencing any movement or circulatory, respiratory, EEG, or EKG
activity); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4130(1) (McKinney 1971) (defining "live birth," for purpose of
requiring vital statistics report, as "complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of a product
of conception, irrespective of the duration of pregnancy, which, after such separation, breathes or
shows any other evidence of life . . ").
22. See, e.g., Enders, Letter, 290 N. Eng. J. Med. 1199 (1974); Vaheri, et al., supra note 18;
Letter from Charles A. Janeway, M.D., Dep't of Pediatrics, Harvard Med. School, to Dr. Robert
Stone, Director, Nat'l Inst. of Health, Jan. 3, 1973. See also Philipson, Sabath & Charles,
Transplacental Passage of Erythromycin and Clindamycin, 288 N. Eng. J. Med. 1219 (1973).
23. See, e.g., R. Billingham & W. Silvers, The Immunobiology of Transplantation 168
(1971); Walbert, Preface to Abortion, Society and the Law at xv n.I (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds.
1973).
Under the HEW Proposals, activities involving an abortus as an organ or tissue donor shall be
conducted in accordance with applicable state or local laws. HEW Proposals, Proposed 45
C.F.R. § 46.309, 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974). Under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, as adopted
in most states, organs or tissues may be donated by persons of"sound mind and 18 years of age or
more." Uniform Anatomical Gift Act § 2(a). In addition, the Act provides for donation of cadaver
parts, in the absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent or persons with a
superior interest, with the permission of specified persons. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act § 2(b).
See generally Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1182 1186-89 (1974).
Under the Act, donation of an abortus' tissues, organs, or remains could be accomplished with
the permission of (a) either parent, (b) an adult brother or sister, (c) a guardian of the fetus' person
at the time of death, or (d) any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body,
assuming no opposition from a member of the same or a prior class. See Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act §§ 2(b)(3)-(6).
24. See, e.g., Johnson, The Initiation of Respiration and the Neonatal Status, in Intra-
Uterine Development 498 (A. Barnes ed. 1968); Letter from Keith P. Russell, M.D., Pres., Am.
Coll. Ob. & Gyn., to Rep. Paul G. Rogers, Sept. 28, 1973, on file, Director, Nat'l Inst. of Health.
25. See note 8 supra.
26. HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738, 31743 (1973); id., Proposed 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.35(b)(2)-(3), 38 Fed. Reg. 31747 (1973).
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(2) a prohibition against any research activity involving pregnant
women which might adversely affect the fetus; 27
(3) a prohibition on in vitro fertilization pending demonstration of
its safety in sub-humans and establishment of the responsibilities of
the involved parties; 28 and
(4) a requirement that no child (including a viable fetus) be put at
risk unless the information can be gained in no other way and the
risk is insignificant or far outweighed by the potential benefit. 29
In addition, the proposal would create Ethical Review Boards at the
funding agency to advise on ethical standards and review specific
proposals, 30 and Protection Committees at the sponsoring institutions
to oversee the selection of subjects and the conduct of research. 3 '
These two new bodies, and a provision requiring the consent of both
parents, 32 were designed to supplement the protections afforded by
present review structures and legal consent requirements.
Following extensive public comment, HEW promulgated a revised
draft of the proposed regulations in August 1974. 33 Principal changes
in the revised regulations included:
(1) the prohibition on artificial continuation of vital signs of an
abortus was removed where the purpose of the research was to
develop new methods to enable the abortus to survive to viability;34
and
27. HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738, 31739 (1973); id., Proposed 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.31(a)(1), .37, 38 Fed. Reg. 31747 (1973).
28. HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738, 31743 (1973); cf. id., Proposed 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.31(a)(3), .33(i), .34, 38 Fed. Reg. 31747 (1973). See also id., 39 Fed. Reg. 30650 (1974).
29. HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31740-41 (1973); see id., Proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.25(b),
.26(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 31746 (1973).
30. HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31741 (1973); id., Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.25, 38 Fed.
Reg. 31746 (1973). See also id., Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.304, 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974).
31. HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31741-42 (1973); id., Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.26, 38 Fed.
Reg. 31746 (1973). See also id., Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.305, 39 Fed. Reg. 30653-54 (1974).
32. HEW Proposals, 38 Fed. Reg. 31742 (1973); id., Proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.27(c), .38, 38
Fed. Reg. 31746, 31747 (1973). Under the revised regulations, paternal consent is required only if
the activity is not responding to the health needs of the pregnant woman and the father is
reasonably available. Id., 39 Fed. Reg. 30651 (1974); see id., Proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.306(b),
.307(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973).
33. HEW Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 30648 (1974).
34. HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.307(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974); see id., 39
Fed. Reg. 30651 (1974). The provision is worded ambiguously: "Vital functions of an abortus will
not be artificially maintained except where the purpose of the activity is to develop new methods
for enabling the abortus to survive to the point of viability .... " Id., Proposed 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.307(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974). The inclusion of "to develop new methods" suggests that
such experimentation is permissible irrespective of anticipated benefits to the particular subject,
while use of the definite article in "the abortus" suggests the contrary.
A fetus surviving an abortion may be made a ward of the state. See, e.g., Ind. Code
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(2) experimental activity involving pregnant women would be
permitted in order to respond to the fetus' or mother's health needs,
or, as part of an abortion procedure, to improve methods of prenatal
diagnosis, preventing premature birth or intervention to offset ge-
netic or congenital abnormality. 35
This second proposal will serve as a focus for the analysis to be
developed in this Article. 3 6
§ 35-1-58.5-7(c) (Supp. 1974) [Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-113 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1974)1; Minn. Stat.
145.415(3), [1974] Minn. Laws ch. 177, § 5(3); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-311 (Supp. 1973).
35. HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.306(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974); id., 39 Fed.
Reg. 30651 (1974).
36. The proposed regulation provides in pertinent part:
§ 46.306. Activities involving fetuses in
utero or pregnant women.
(a) No activity to which this subpart is applicable, involving fetuses in utero or pregnant
women, may be undertaken unless: (1) the purpose of the activity is to benefit the particular fetus
or to respond to the health needs of the mother, or (2) the activity conducted as part of (but not
prior to the commencement of) a procedure to terminate the pregnancy and is for the purpose of
evaluating or improving methods of prenatal diagnosis, methods or prevention of premature
birth, or methods of intervention to offset the effects of genetic abnormality or congenital injury.
(b) Activities covered by this subpart which are permissible under paragraph (a) of this section
may be conducted only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given their
consent, except that the father's consent need not be secured if: (1) the purpose of the activity is to
respond to the health needs of the mother or (2) his identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be
ascertained.
(c) Activities covered by this subpart which are permissible under paragraph (a)(2) of this
section may not be undertaken unless individuals engaged in the research will have no part in: (1)
any decisions as to the timing, method, or procedures used to terminate the pregnancy, and (2)
determining the viability of the fetus at the termination of the pregnancy.
§ 46.307 Activities involving abortuses.
No activity to which this subpart is applicable, involving an abortus. may be undertaken
unless:
(a) Appropriate studies on animals have been completed;
(b) The mother and father are legally competent and have given their consent. except that the
father's consent need not be secured if his identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be
ascertained;
(c) Individuals engaged in the research will have no part in: (1) any decisions as to the timing.
method, or procedures used to terminate the pregnancy, and (2) determining the viability of the
fetus at the termination of the pregnancy;
(d) Vital functions of an abortus will not be artificially maintained except where the purpose of
the activity is to develop new methods for enabling the abortus to survive to the point of viability,
and
(e) Experimental procedures which would terminate the heart beat or respiration of the abortus
will not be employed.
§ 46.308 Activities involving a dead fetus
or abortus.
Activities involving a dead fetus or abortus shall be conducted in accordance with any
applicable State or local laws governing autopsy.
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III. EXPERIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES RELEVANT TO THE
FORMULATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS
An act of human medical experimentation may have a number of
consequences wbich can be, in the particular case, consistent or
inconsistent with promoting "health" and "human dignity." The term
"health" will -be used broadly to encompass the physical, mental, and
emotional well-being of the subject or other affected persons. "Dig-
nity" is used here in the sense of "worth," or the values associated
with being human.There may be other consequences of experimenta-
tion in addition to those discussed here; however, no others seem to be
considered very frequently in making decisions about experimentation
or deciding its permissible limits. 37
A. Health38
Experimentation has beneficial health consequences for the subject
when his disorder is identified (diagnosis) or relieved (therapy). The
subject also benefits if the experimental procedure protects against a
disorder not presently suffered but which threatens (prophylaxis).
Furthermore, the subject benefits if the experiment leads to knowledge
which can be used for diagnosis or therapy of a disorder he might
suffer subsequent to the experiment. 39 On the other hand, an experi-
mental procedure can harm the subject when it aggravates a disorder
from which he suffers (or adds a separate disorder), injures the
subject's good health, or makes the subject more susceptible to a
disorder in the future.
Experimentation may also have consequences for individuals other
than the subject. Those who suffer from the same or a similar disorder
as the subject may benefit because the knowledge obtained can be
applied to their diagnosis or therapy. Even when their health condition
differs from the subject's, others can still benefit when the knowledge
about human biological processes gained from the experiment is ap-
37. The categorization of consequences which has been adopted herein has been influenced by
Callahan's explication of the "rule systems" subsumed under the principle of "the sanctity of life."
D. Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice & Morality 327-33 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Callahan].
38. Compare the five categories of pediatric experiments set out in Mitchell, The Child and
Experimental Medicine, 1 Brit. Med. J. 721, 723 (1964): "1. An experiment in treatment with the
immediate aim of curing the child's disease. 2. An experiment on an ill child in order to find out
more about his condition. 3. An experiment on an ill child in order to learn more about the
disease from which he is suffering. 4. An experiment on a child who is either well or suffering
from another disease in order to find out more about a particular disease. 5. An experiment,
usually on a healthy child, designed to provide information about children in general."




plied to their cases.40 For example, dispensing new drugs to normal
"control" subjects is used to establish safe dosage levels for therapeutic
purposes. 41 Detrimental effects on the health of nonsubjects can occur
when the experiment causes a disease to spread. Harm to the subject
can also affect the emotional well-being of friends and relatives.
Experimentation may also have such widespread consequences on
the health of others as to affect a community or mankind as a whole.
For example, experimentation can result in knowledge which might
stop the spread of an epidemic threatening to destroy a whole com-
munity. Plague and smallpox have historically been such threats. 42
Survival of the human species has not yet been an objective of medical
experimentation; it might become so if, for example, further environ-
mental pollution were to produce significant genetic mutations. It
should be noted that a distinction is drawn here between consequences
which involve individuals, whether singly or in large groups, and
those related to the survival of the community or species as a whole.
For example, while numerous persons could be restored to health by
kidney transplants, 43 the survival of society is hardly affected by
whether those persons die of acute renal failure now or arteriosclerosis
later. 44
B. Dignity
The concept of human "dignity" reflects our society's esteem for the
status of being human. This esteem is evidenced by the protections
society provides, and to which each individual is entitled solely
because of his status as a human. One particularly sensitive conse-
quence of experimentation is the touching, entering, or otherwise
changing of the subject's body. Irrespective of any modification
brought on thereby in the subject's well-being, the contact violates his
40. See, e.g., Blumgart, The Medical Framework for Viewing the Problem of Human
Experimentation, in Experimentation with Human Subjects 39, 4243 (P. Freund ed. 1970).
41. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(aX2), Form FD-1571, item 10(a) (1974). See also Cavers, The Legal
Control of the Clinical Investigation of Drugs: Some Political, Economic, and Social Questions,
in Experimentation with Human Subjects 225 (P. Freund ed. 1970); Curran, Governmental
Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The Approach of Two Federal
Agencies, in Experimentation with Human Subjects 402 (P. Freund ed. 1970).
42. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905); Jonas, Philosophical Reflections
on Experimenting with Human Subjects, in Experimentation with Human Subjects 1, 11-13 (P.
Freund ed. 1970). "
43. See, e.g., Dempsey, Transplants Are Common; Now It's the Organs That Have Become
Rare, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 56, 57 (8000 candidates per year for kidney
transplants); Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1182, 1201-03 (1974).
44. See Jonas, supra note 42, at 11; cf. Brauer, Moral and Ethical Considerations Concerning
Abortion, in Conference on Antenatal Diagnosis 243, 24546 (A. Dorfman ed. 1972).
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bodily integrity. His individuality is reduced by sharing his corporeal
being with another.
A second effect of experimentation is to exploit 45 the subject, in that
the invasion or manipulation of his body provides benefits to others.
The subject's withholding, or others' claiming, of those benefits will
have the effect of increasing, in the former case, and reducing, in the
latter, the subject's individuality.
Experimentation can also have consequences for the subject's "self-
determination." If he chooses to be experimented upon, he is "[making]
for himself [one of] those choices which significantly affect[s] his
personal fate."'46 However, if he is made an experimental subject
without such a choice, his individuality (in the sense of being indepen-
dent of the effects of others' acts and decisions) is again diminished.
Finally, the manner in which experimentation is conducted may
affect the trust among members of the community that society will
protect the dignity of an individual irrespective of that individual's
ability to assert and enforce a claim to such protection. When the
bodily integrity of an experimental subject is invaded for the benefit of
others and without his free choice, the effect can be (depending on
other circumstances) to weaken the mutual trust which helps hold the
members of a community together, because they can no longer be sure
they will be protected when unable to protect themselves.
C. Health and Dignity Consequences of the HEW
Proposed Regulations
The most recent proposed HEW regulations in effect say that the
Department will provide financial support for research involving phys-
ical invasions of conceptuses only when an anticipated consequence is
a benefit to the health of the subject or to that of the mother. 47 A
benefit to the health of others may not be, by itself, a consequence
sufficiently valuable to justify invading the bodily integrity of the
fetus, although health benefits to others are a permissible incidental
effect of experimentation. However, when the subject is a conceptus in
the process of abortion or an abortus (living and outside the mother,
but non-viable),48 a physical invasion is permissible if an anticipated
45. Use of the word "exploit" is intended to be without any negative connotation. It is
perhaps indicative of the values involved that one has great difficulty finding a word which will
convey the idea of "providing benefit to others" without either positive or negative connotation.
46. Callahan 332; see Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3,
163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
47. See HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.306(a)(1), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974).
48. See HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.303(f), 39 Fed. Reg. 30653 (1974).
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consequence is a benefit to the health of others.4 9 Such permissible
invasions do not include those which would be a serious health
detriment to the subject by terminating vital signs or which would
constitute a substantial manipulation of the subject's bodily processes
by prolonging life when the expected benefit to health is not as
substantial as allowing the fetus to survive to viability.50
The apparent premises of the proposed regulations include the
following: first, benefit to the health of others is usually not as valuable
a consequence as preserving human individuality from physical inva-
sion and exploitation. Permitting experimentation on the conceptus for
the benefit of the mother is, of course, an exception to this premise.
Second, the human dignity of an abortus is not as valuable as that of a
conceptus being carried to term. This may reflect a specific determina-
tion that (a) the abortus is "less human" or "non-human" and therefore
less injured by physical invasion and exploitation; or (b) that the
mutual trust that society will protect the vulnerable is less affected
when the subject is an abortus. We can test these two major premises
(and the implicit values they reflect) by a comparison with other
situations involving similar consequences. Such a comparison may be
facilitated by focusing on three specific questions: (1) what conse-
quences are more valued than physical inviolability; (2) is the same
relative valuation applied to all subjects of experimentation; and (3) if
not, what factors affect the valuation?
IV. COMPARABLE SITUATIONS
This section investigates other situations which produce health and
dignity consequences similar to those of fetal experimentation, with a
view to determining the relative value society assigns the conse-
quences.
A. Compulsory Medical Treatment
Compulsory medical treatment can have consequences similar to
those resulting from experimentation. Instances in which compulsory
medical treatment has become the subject of litigation include vaccina-
tions to prevent disease or stop its spread, 5 ' transfusions for patients in
49. CL HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.306(a)(2), .307, 39 Fed. Reg. 30654
(1974).
50. See HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.307(d), (e), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974).
Query whether a similar limitation on application of life-support procedures would or should be
made in the case of terminally-Ri adults. See generally J. Katz, Experimentation with Human
Beings ch. 14 (1972).
51. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I1 (1905).
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extremis, 52 and reconstructive surgery for an infant.53 In each of these
instances (except possibly vaccination to stop the spread of disease),
the principal effect of the treatment was to improve the health of the
subject. However, if anything were to go wrong, the subject's health
could be impaired. Incidental effects on the health of others could
likewise be either beneficial or detrimental: in some instances, the
treatment may stop the spread of disease, but in others the treatment
may upset the emotional well-being of the subject's relatives (e.g.,
giving a blood transfusion to a child of a Jehovah's Witness). Usually,
compulsory medical treatment is not exploitative, but it does involve
the invasion of the subject's bodily integrity, and this may be without
(or contrary to) his exercise of free choice.
B. Organ Transplantation
Organ transplantation can also have consequences akin to those of
experimentation.5 4 The donor may benefit physically through better
medical care incident to the donation and emotionally through a sense
of having helped another. 55 However, the donor's health may also be
injured, either by a mishap in the medical procedure or by an
increased susceptibility to future disorders. 56 For the donee, the benefit
to his health provides the incentive to transplant, but if there is a
mishap in the operation, the transplant fails to take, or immunosup-
pressive drugs sufficiently lower his resistance to disease, his health
may be impaired rather than benefitted. The health effects of trans-
plantation on others are most likely to be related to emotional well-
being: for example, there may be both relief at having the donee
52. See, e.g., Application of President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
petition for rehearing en banc denied per curiam, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. 111. 1972); United States
v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972);
In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 4N.E.2d 435 (1965); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252, N.Y.S.2d 705
(Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio CL C.P. 1962); Note, Compulsory Medical
Treatment The State's Interest Re-evaluated, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 293 (1966).
53. See In re Seiferth, 285 App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't), rev'd, 309 N.Y. 80,
127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); Green Appeal, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
54. See generally Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972);
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App.), cert.
denied, 284 So. 2d 338 (La. 1973); Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in
Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 891 (1959) (three unreported Massachusetts cases discussed).
55. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 374-75, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Super. Ct. 1972)
(strong identification between donor and donee, as twin sisters); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d
145, 146 (Ky. 1969) (incompetent donor devoted to donee-brother, emotional benefit found).




healthier and guilt at having subjected the donor to sacrifice of an
organ.5 7 At the present time, organ transplantation is not so wide-
spread as to have a significant effect on the well-being of the commu-
nity or species.
Looking to the "dignity" effects of organ transplantation, it is clear
that the donor's physical integrity has been breached. This is exploita-
tive of the donor since the principal purpose of the invasion is to
benefit another, with only incidental benefit accruing to the donor. On
some occasions the donation can result from the donor's exercise of free
choice. If that choice is not freely exercised, however, the individuality
of the donor is reduced, thereby weakening trust in society's protec-
tions for the vulnerable.
C. Abortion
In abortion, it is the detriment to the health of the subject (abortus)
which is most obvious, although if birth would result in a defective
child, it has been argued that death is a health benefit to the subject. 58
Abortion can be a direct health benefit to the mother by terminating a
pregnancy causing or threatening physical harm; it can be an indirect
health benefit by preventing the birth of a child who would compete
for scarce resources. On the other hand, the mother's physical health
can be harmed in the abortion procedure and her emotional well-being
can suffer from shame, guilt, or remorse. The health benefits to people
other than mother and abortus come from lessened competition for
resources. As far as the community and species are concerned, benefits
come from avoiding overpopulation and having to care for numerous
people with congenital defects; but if abortion becomes too frequent,
the society or species cannot reproduce itself.5 9
In the current context, the principal "dignity" effects of abortion are
the benefits to the mother's self-determination by permitting her to
choose how to use her body and the detriment to the conceptus' bodily
57. See Note, Transplantation-Incompetent Donors: Was the First Step or the Last Taken
in Strunk v. Strunk?, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 754, 766 (1970); cf. 16 Wayne L. Rev. 1460, 1469-70
(1970).
58. See HL Rudel, F. Kind & M. Henzl, Birth Control 232-39 (1973); Nisnander, Abortion
Practices in the United States: A Medical Viewpoint, in Abortion, Society, and the Law 199,
206-08 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973). But see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30, 227
A.2d 689, 693 (1967); Stewart v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 58 Mfisc. 2d 432, 436, 296 N.Y.S.2d
41, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd
mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Callahan, Abortion: Some
Ethical Issues, in Abortion, Society, and the Law 89, 96 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973);
Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right To Be Born, in Abortion, Society, and the Law 123,
129-31 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
59. See Callahan 329-30.
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inviolability. Some would say that the third principal effect is a
reduced trust in society's commitment to protect the weak and the
helpless. 60 Compulsory abortion would be detrimental to the mother's
self-determination and prohibiting abortion could be detrimental by
preventing her from avoiding the consequences of a previous breach of
her bodily integrity (e.g., after she has been raped). 61
V. FACTORS AFFECTING THE VALUATION OF
EXPERIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Inapplicable Factors
The situations set out in the preceding section involve two factors
not strictly applicable in the HEW regulations: species or community
survival and individual self-determination. Survival of the community
(or even of the species) is the objective of compulsory medical treat-
ment such as mass immunization or quarantine. In each of those cases,
any possible benefit to the health of the subject arising from the
invasion of his bodily integrity and self-determination is incidental to
the anticipated health benefit to the community or human race as a
whole. 62 The HEW regulations make no reference to experimentation
directed toward protection of the community or species; the assump-
tion here is that they would not prohibit it, but that in such circum-
stances the value of collective survival would allow the regulations to
be disregarded or amended.
The second conclusion drawn from the other situations-that the
value of self-determination outweighs benefits to others or even to the
subject-does not apply to fetal experimentation. Even if a particular
course of action would provide a health benefit for the subject, such
action is impermissible if the subject does not exercise his power to
choose what will be done to his person. 63 Because self-determination is
60. See, e.g., Callahan 420-22; Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court onl
Abortion, 41 Fordharn L. Rev. 807, 857-62 (1973); Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, in
Abortion, Society, and the Law 103, 111-16 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
61. See Callahan 332-33.
62. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-30 (1905); P. Ramsey, The Patient as
Person 15-16 (1970). See Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Sub-
jects, in Experimentation with Human Subjects 6-7 (P. Freund ed. 1970).
63. See, e.g., Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 153 N.W. 692 (1915); Bang v. Charles T.
Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173
(1955). See also Garzione v. Vassar Bros. Hosp., 36 App. Div. 2d 390, 320 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1st
Dep't 1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 857, 286 N.E.2d 731, 335 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1972). See
generally W. Prosser, Torts 34-37, 101-05 (4th ed. 1971). When an emergency threatens death or
serious bodily harm to an unconscious patient, consent to remedial measures is "implied,"
protecting the actor from liability. Id. at 103, 104.
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so highly valued, every major ethical code64 makes informed consent a
prerequisite to experimentation on a competent adult. 6 Similarly,
informed consent is required of adult organ donors. 66 In fact, the
principle has been extended to permit patients to refuse medical
treatment which would save their lives. 67 The high value given
self-determination is manifest when the subject is incompetent: for
example, when a court honors the previously expressed wishes of an
unconscious patient not to have a life-saving treatment 68 or when a
decision about corrective surgery for a teenager is postponed until he is
old enough to choose for himself. 69 However, the power to make the
decisions significantly affecting one's life implemented by the require-
ment of consent, 70 is usually reserved to those capable of rationally
exercising the power (even though they are free to act irrationally in its
exercise).71 Because the fetus is unable to exercise self-determination in
64. See United States v. Karl Brandt: 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals 181-82 (1947); cf. American Medical Ass'n, Opinions and Reports of the
Judicial Council iii-vii, 9 (1969); World Medical Ass'n, Declaration of Helsinki, in J. Katz,
Experimentation with Human Beings 312; Medical Research Council. Report for the Year
1962-1963, Cmnd. No. 2382, at 23 (1964).
65. Cf. note 63 supra.
66. See Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 Mich. L. Rev. !182, 1193-94 (1974).
67. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27,
252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. CL 1962). Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest
Re-evaluated, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 293 (1966). But see United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752
(D. Conn. 1965).
68. In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Il. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); see Holmes v. Silver Cross
Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. IIl. 1972). But see Application of President & Dirs. of
Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, petition for rehearing en banc denied per curiam, 331
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hasp. v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). The decision in Brooks ultimately rested on Mr.
Justice Brandeis' view that "[the framers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion). As
Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger noted, this protection extends to "a great many foolish,
unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment
even at great risk." Application of President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., supra at 1017
(Burger, J., concurring on other grounds); accord, In re Estate of Brooks supra at 372-74, 205
N.E.2d at 442-43.
69. See In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 85-86, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1955); cf. Green Appeal, 448
Pa. 338, 349-50, 292 A.2d 387, 392-93 (1972). But see In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 672, 317
N.Y.S.2d 641, 655 (Family CL 1970), aff'd mem., 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (3d
Dep't 1971), afl'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
70. See generally Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 Fordham L. Rev. 639
(1968).
71. "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body...." Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
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any sense, this consequence per se is properly disregarded in the
regulations.
B. Benefit to the Subject
It is clear-that a breach of physical integrity for medical treatment,
which would be barred in the case of a nonconsenting adult, will be
permitted on the ground of a health benefit to an infant or incompetent
subject. 72 A benefit to the well-being of the donor-subject has also
been mentioned as a requirement where an organ transplant is sought
from an infant or incompetent. 73 Furthermore, abortion is occasionally
justified on the ground that a health benefit is conferred on a fetus by
killing it rather than allowing it to be born severely handicapped. 74 To
the extent, then, that the proposed regulations permit violation of the
conceptus' physical integrity for the benefit of its health, they are not
inconsistent with the respective valuation given those factors in similar
situations.
C. Special Relationships
The HEW regulation that a fetus may be put at risk by an
experimental procedure only if the fetus itself is expected to benefit
does not apply in two situations: when the procedure is undertaken for
the benefit of the mother, and when the fetus is being, or has been,
aborted. 75 The maternal benefit exception can be explained on the
basis of a special relationship between the subject and the other party
deriving principal benefit from the procedure. Such a relationship is
present in the organ-transplant cases (for immunological reasons,
siblings are the best donors) 76 and might be used to rationalize even
72. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 II. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537 (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181
A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641
(Family Ct. 1970), aff'd mem., 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd
mem., 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1962). The court frequently weighs the anticipated benefits of the procedure
against the risks involved. See, e.g., In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct.
1966) (amputation improper as not a life-saving measure); In re Sampson, supra at 660-61,
669-75, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45, 652-58.
73. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146, 149 (Ky. 1969); see id. at 151 (dissenting
opinion); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 284 So. 2d 338 (La.
1973); Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
891, 892-95 (1959) (discussing three unreported Massachusetts cases).
74. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
75. See HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.306(a)(1)-(2), .307, 39 Fed. Reg,. 30654
(1974).
76. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 372-73, 289 A.2d 386, 388-89 (Super. Ct. 1972).
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those cases where the court really paid only lip service to the idea that
the donor would derive benefit from the procedure." Valuing physical
inviolability less than health benefit to another only when the other is
closely related might reflect a judgment that a benefit to a sibling, for
example, is somehow more desirable than a benefit to a stranger. A
further judgment might be that because the possible subjects are
limited in number and strictly defined (i.e., siblings of a person
needing a transplant), the likely effect on the mutual trust that society
will protect the vulnerable is minimal. 78 The importance of the close
relationship between subject and beneficiary is even more evident in
the case of abortion. There, the fetus is a physical parasite in the
mother. 79 As such, its presence can have an effect on the mother's
health; more precisely, an abortion can be not only an indirect health
benefit to the mother and others by destroying a being that would
compete for the resources available, but a direct health benefit to the
mother alone. Furthermore, since the fetus in utero is a part of the
woman's body, any interference with her decision to abort is a
detriment to her self-determination. 0  A constraint on a woman's
77. The donor in the Strunk case was a twenty-seven year old retardate (mental age of six)
residing in a state institution. A psychiatrist testified that the donor would benefit because he was
emotionally and psychologically dependent on his donee-brother, and the brother's death would
be traumatic for him. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969). Similar testimony of
psychological benefit was relied upon in the unreported cases discussed in Curran, supra note 73,
at 893. However, the proof of benefit to the donor (either in avoidance of psychological trauma or
in satisfaction from giving) is tenuous in these cases, especially when the donor is young or
retarded. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 375, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (Super. Ct. 1972)
(disregarding psychiatric testimony concerning benefit to seven year old donor); Strunk v. Strunk,
supra at 150 (dissenting opinion); Curran, supra note 73, at 895-96; Note, Transplantation
-Incompetent Donors: Was the First Step or the Last Taken in Strunk v. Strunk?, 58 Calif. L.
Rev. 754, 758-63 (1970); 16 Wayne L. Rev. 1460, 1464-67 (1970).
78. The decision permitting transplantation in Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d
386 (Super. Ct. 1972), seems to be founded ultimately on a decision that the benefits to the donee
would be great and the risks to the donor insignificant: "A further question before this court is
whether it should abandon the donee to a brief medically complicated life and eventual death or
permit the natural parents to take some action based on reason and medical probability in order
to keep both children alive. The court will choose the latter course .... ." Id. at 376, 289 A.2d at
390; see id. at377-78, 289 A.2d at 390. In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), the
court implied that a skin graft from a fifteen year old would have been permissible, if only the
donor's mother had consented. See id. at 123. Permission for transplantation in the cases
discussed in Curran, supra note 73, may also be explained on the ground of findings that the
minor donors had consented. See Curran, supra note 73, at 892-96; Note, Transplantation
-Incompetent Donors: Was the First Step or the Last Taken in Strunk v. Strunk?, 58 Calif. L.
Rev. 754, 762 (1970).
79. Cf. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d
537, 538 (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (transfusion of pregnant mother
authorized to save life of fetus; welfare of child and mother "intertwined and inseparable").
80. See Callahan 332. The Supreme Court's decision permitting a state to proscribe abortion
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freedom to make significant decisions about her life does not, of
course, justify infanticide; it is only the extremely close physical
relationship which permits abortion. The same considerations apply
with respect to fetal experimentation: since a mother is not barred
from destroying the organism in utero, she should not be precluded
from medical treatment which would be experimental and otherwise
impermissible as to the fetus.8 The physical inviolability of the
fetus-parasite must be given less value than the health of the
mother-host.82
D. Development of the Subject
The abortion context suggests another factor which might affect the
values placed on various consequences: development of the subject as
a full human.8 3 This factor might explain why it is permissible to abort
subsequent to viability, except to preserve the life or health of the mother, values the mother's
health more than her self-determination. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). This
valuation is contrary to that applied in compulsory medical treatment. See text accompanying
notes 67-68 supra. However, it is appropriate because the death of another (the viable fetus) is a
consequence of abortion but not of refused medical treatment.
81. Authority to treat the pregnant mother in a way which constitutes experimentation on the
fetus does not, of course, relieve the physician of the ethical obligation to treat the mother with
the good of both "patients" in mind.
"Liberalized" abortion laws have undoubtedly removed much of the incentive which previously
existed to use "health needs of the mother" as a justification for invading the fetus. See
Guttmacher, The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in New York: A Personal Insight, in Abortion,
Society, and the Law 63, 69 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
83. The analysis in this section has been influenced by the discussion of the "beginning of
human life" in Callahan chs. 10-11. He summarizes the philosophical basis of his argument as
follows:
"I have argued, in the first stage, that a teleological analysis of the biological data is legitimate,
necessary and illuminating as a philosophical basis for approaching an answer to the question of
when life begins. I have argued, in the second stage, that an important movement in some
scientific disciplines concerned with the 'human' is that the 'human' must be defined not in
single-character, or essentialistic, terms but rather in terms of variety and diversity. Moreover,
there is considerable agreement that an analysis of the 'human' must take account, holistically, of
the biological, the psychological and the cultural; no one of them can be scanted, at the cost of
misunderstanding the others. I have also tried to point out the importance of 'potentiality' and
'capacity' in analyzing 'human life,' adding an affirmation of the language of 'levels of organiza-
tion' as helpful in understanding the process whereby the potential is made actual." Id. at 368. As
a consequence he rejects both the "genetic school," which treats the question of the "beginning of
human life" (for purposes of deciding the protections to be accorded prenatal beings by virtue of
their being "human") as one to be decided solely on biological data, and the "social-consequences"
school, which gives no effect to the biological data (defining the fetus as "non-human") and
defines "human" only in terms of achieved potentialities. Id. at 399-400. The approach chosen is
the "developmental school" which, in deciding the protection to be accorded prenatal beings,
considers both the achieved biological commonality with other "human life" and the potentiality
for psychological and cultural similarity. See id. at 384-90, 399.
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a six-week embryo but not a seven-month fetus. In Roe v. Wade, 84 the
Supreme Court decided that a state could not interfere on behalf of the
fetus in the decision of a woman and her doctor to abort until the fetus
was sufficiently developed to be able to survive outside the womb to
the point where it could independently maintain vital functions.85 In
effect that decision says that the relative valuation of consequences to
the mother's health and self-determination and the fetus' health and
physical inviolability is dependent upon the stage of the fetus' de-
velopment. When the subject is pre-viable, as in both abortion and
fetal experimentation, its development might be a reasonable factor to
consider in valuing the consequences. For example, detriments to the
dignity or health of a conceptus may be seen as less significant
(quantitatively) than detriments to the dignity or health of an adult or
other post-viable person. Alternatively, the violation of a conceptus'
bodily integrity and its exploitation might be justified on the ground
that neither will have a significant effect on trust in societal protection
of the vulnerable. In other words, experimentation for the benefit only
of others on a two year old or a mental incompetent might make me
fear experimentation if I should become comatose; but experimentation
on a one-inch embryo at six weeks is so clearly distinguishable that it
would have no such effect. Thus if the stage of development were
taken as an acceptable factor in valuing consequences (and the abor-
tion rules suggest it would be appropriate), the regulations could
acceptably give less protection-i.e., not require subject health
benefit-to early prenatal life.
Roe v. Wade set two prenatal dividing lines relating to state
involvement with abortions which might also be appropriate in the
experimentation context. The first, at the end of the first trimester,
marks the beginning of the period in which the state may regulate the
abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal health.8 6
That point was selected because it is there that the method of abortion
is usually changed and the risk to the mother is thereby substantially
increased. 87 Because this first trimester dividing line was selected with
reference only to effects on maternal health and with no consideration
for the fetus' human dignity, it is not necessarily helpful in the
experimentation context. The second line drawn in Roe was at viabil-
ity of the fetus. At viability the state may regulate or proscribe
abortions which are not for the purpose of preserving the life or health
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85. Id. at 162-66.
86. Id. at 163, 164.




of the mother.88 Because this line was calculated with reference to the
effects on both mother and fetus, viability might possibly serve as a
useful criterion for experimentation restrictions. Since viability marks
the completion of the process of biological individualization, in the
sense of being physically unique, it is probably the latest point at
which it is appropriate to treat the conceptus differently from an infant
in regard to physical invasions.8 9
There are at least three problems with using viability as the lower
boundary to protect the fetus against experimentation solely for the
benefit of others. First, the criterion is indefinite in that, in any
particular case, it requires the assessment of the varied development of
numerous systems in order to determine how the organism as a whole
will be able to cope with its environment. 90 Because of this
indefiniteness and the individual judgment involved in making the
determination, there may be a substantial opportunity for abuse. That
opportunity could, of course, be minimized by setting the line conser-
vatively (e.g., twenty-two weeks)9' or, as is done in the HEW propos-
als, by requiring the determination of viability to be made by persons
independent of the research project.92 A second objection to a viability
standard is that it will vary with the available technology. At the
present time, twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks' gestation is sufficient
for viability;93 before incubators and other such devices for neonatal
care were developed, any birth before full term meant a limited chance
to survive; and before too long, research into in vitro fertilization and
an "artificial womb" may make the concept of viability meaningless. 94
In these circumstances, there may be some advantage in using a
88. 410 U.S. at 163-65.
89. Significant steps in the process of physical individualization are: (1) The single-cell zygote
(with the usual 46 chromosomes) is formed from the union (at fertilization) of the sperm and egg
cells (each bringing 23 chromosomes from the respective parent). Biological individuality is
largely determined at fertilization, since the virtually infinite possibilities for chromosomal pairing
make each zygote genetically unique. See Callahan 373. (2) However, at some time during the
second or third week, genetically identical twins may be formed by a splitting of the embryo. See
id. 372. See also id. 379-80. (3) Physical individuality, in the sense both of uniqueness and
independence from the biological functioning of any other particular organism, can potentially be
achieved at viability, although it is not actually accomplished until parturition. See Fletcher,
Abortion, Euthanasia, and Care of Defective Newborns, 292 N. Eng. J. Med. 75, 76 (1975).
90. See HEW Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 37993 (1974).
91. See letter from Charles B. Reiner, M.D., Children's Hosp., Columbus, Ohio, to Donald
T. Chalkley, M.D., Chief, Institutional Relations Branch, Natl Inst. of Health, Jan. 14, 1974.
92. HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. §46.307(cX2), 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974).
93. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
94. See HEW Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 30651 (1974); Culliton, Manslaughter: The Charge
against Edelin of Boston City Hospital, 186 Sci. 327, 330 (1974); Experiments on the Fetus, 2
Brit. Med. J. 433, 434 (1970). But see HEW Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 37993 (1974).
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dividing line which is less a function of technology and more related to
the conceptus' development toward full humanness. The third, and
most persuasive, objection to a viability standard is that, for the
foreseeable future at least, it would afford protection against being
used only at a point later than is probably acceptable to many people.
At six months' gestation, a normal fetus is about thirteen inches in
height and two pounds in weight.9" As the fetus is quite recognizably
human at that stage, 96 many people might be reluctant not to treat it
in the same manner as a newborn infant for experimentation purposes
(i.e., the detriment to mutual trust in social protection for the vulner-
able would be too significant).
A better dividing line could be drawn at about forty-five days'
gestation. This point is significant in two respects. First, the end of the
seventh week marks the end of the embryonic and the beginning of the
fetal periods. 97 Although by that time the beginning of all essential
external and internal structures are present, the conceptus is under one
and one-quarter inches in height and its face will not have a human
appearance for another two weeks. 98 In addition, central nervous
system ("CNS") electrical activity ("brain waves") has been detected
beginning early in the seventh week. 99 The commencement of brain
functioning marks a significant stage in the development of the or-
ganism toward full "humanness.' 00 Relating protection of human
dignity to CNS activity at the beginning of life is in a sense symmetri-
cal with the modern definition of death as a flat electro-
encephalogram. 10' Just as we say that the "person-hood" has passed
with cessation of CNS activity even though human genetic material
may continue alive with artificial support, so may we say that
95. See K. Moore, Before We Are Born-Basic Embryology and Birth Defects, 57, 60 (1974).
96. See id. at 63.
97. See id.; letter from James W. Lash, M.D., Univ. of Pennsylvania School of Med., to
Director, Nat'l Inst. of Health, Nov. 28, 1973.
98. See K. Moore, supra note 95, at 4.
99. Borkowski & Bernstine, Electroencephalography of the Fetus, 5 Neurology 362 (1955).
Theoretically, some electrical activity should be detectable in the fetal heart as early as 25-30
days. Bernstine & Borkowski, Prenatal Fetal Electrocardiology, 70 Am. J. Ob. & Gyn. 631
(1955).
100. See Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112. 113 (1964).
101. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 77-202 (Supp. 1973) ("absence of spontaneous brain
function" and if resuscitation will not succeed); Va. Code Ann. § 32-364.3:1 (Supp. 1974)
("absence of spontaneous brain functions and spontaneous respiratory functions" and if resuscita-
tion will not succeed); Beecher, Definitions of "Life" and "Death" for Medical Science and
Practice, 169 Annals N.Y. Aca. Si. 471 (1970); Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls,
285 N. Eng. J. Med. 776, 781 (1971); Report of Ad Hoc Comm. of Harv. Med. School to
Examine Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
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"person-hood" is not significantly attained before such activity begins
in human genetic material. 10
2
Although under this proposal the human dignity of conceptuses of
forty-five days is valued less than that of older subjects, the regulations
should reflect some minimal value for the human dignity of the
embryonic subject since the subject is "human" as a biological matter,
regardless of its state of development. 103 For this reason, experimenta-
tion affecting subjects prior to forty-five days' gestation should at least
distinguish the undeveloped human subject from non-human experi-
mental objects. Thus, even the most primitive product of human
conception should not be put at risk to obtain knowledge for the
benefit of non-human organisms, nor to obtain information which is
obtainable from non-human organisms or objects. To fail to give the
conceptus this protection is to deprive it totally of human dignity by
treating it as non-human, rather than the undeveloped human it is. A
further restriction may also be appropriate at this level: if the informa-
tion sought is available from more developed humans, it should be
obtained there, subject to the restrictions imposed at the higher levels.
The idea behind this restriction is to ensure that, while one human
organism at the embryonic level of development may be used to give
benefit to another, the subject will not be chosen to confer this benefit
solely because it is most convenient (in the sense of being a member of
the least protected class). Rather, the subject will be used as a source
of knowledge because it is in the class best able to provide the
knowledge. ' 0 4
VI. ABORTUSES AS SUBJECTS: AN EVALUATION
The HEW regulations which would permit experimentation on an
abortus while prohibiting experimentation on a conceptus of the same
age' 0 5 appear to reflect a judgment that the respective valuations of
"human dignity" against other consequences may be changed if the
subject's life expectancy is certain rather than indefinite. In other
words, an individual becomes less human (i.e., physical integrity and
not being exploited are less valued than other consequences) when the
time of his death is known. So stated as a general rule, the proposition
would have few adherents. An injury to one in extremis does not any
102. See Jacobs & Louisell, Book Review, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1257, 1263 (1970).
103. See note 83 supra.
104. See Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, in Ex-
perimentation with Human Subjects 1, 19-20 (P. Freund ed. 1970).
105. Compare HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.307, 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974),
with HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.306, 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974). See also HEW
Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 30651 (1974).
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less give rise to tort liability for that fact. 106 A terminal condition does
not make a patient any more available for experimentation. 10 7 The
result should be no different when the subject is an abortus. First, the
minimal development of the subject is already given effect in the
experimental rules which apply to all at that stage of development. 108
Second, none of the other factors which go to reducing the value of
human dignity are present in experimentation with abortuses. This is
not a situation where all of the consequences taken together arguably
reach a balance which is protective of the subject's individuality. In
the case of compulsory medical treatment, protection of dignity could
well be at the expense of life. This is not a situation where there is
always a great health benefit to another closely related to the subject,
with little health detriment to the subject. That combination of factors
seems to be required in the organ transplant cases which do not strictly
apply a "benefit to the subject" analysis. ' 09 This is not a situation, like
abortion, where the effect of the detriment to the subject's dignity is to
benefit the dignity of one extremely closely related and substantially
more "human." 110 Finally, because there are no other substantial
factors, acts pursuant to the proposed rule could have a substantial
detrimental effect on the mutual trust that society will protect the
vulnerable. Without the limitations imposed by the close relationship
or subject benefit in the cases just described, no one can be secure
against exploitation in extremis.
Put another way, what is offensive about the provisions which
permit experimentation during abortion, even for such laudatory pur-
poses as "evaluating or improving methods of prenatal diagnosis,
methods of prevention of premature birth, or methods of intervention
to offset the effects of genetic abnormality or congenital injury,"'I is
that the particular subjects are being selected only because they are
convenient. Experimentation for those purposes would not be permit-
ted if the fetuses were to be carried to term; so it is only the decision to
abort which makes the subjects available. But the decision to abort is
based primarily on an evaluation of the consequences to the mother as
against those to the fetus. This evaluation of the act of abortion,
106. See Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1937); cf. Dillon v. Twin State
Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 456-57, 163 A. 111, 114-15 (1932). See generally Carpenter,
Concurrent Causation, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 941, 949-51 (1935); Peaslee, Multiple Causation and
Damage, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1127, 1134-41 (1934).
107. But see Blumgart, The Medical Framework for Viewing the Problem of Human
Experimentation, in Experimentation with Human Subjects 39, 60-61 (P. Freund ed. 1970).
108. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
109. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
111. HEW Proposals, Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.306(a)(2). 39 Fed. Reg. 30654 (1974).
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involving a special relationship, does not consider the consequences of
the entirely separate experimental act. 112 Therefore, the restrictions on
experimentation should be applied without regard to whether the
subjects are being aborted.
VII. CONCLUSION
To the extent that the proposed HEW regulations limit violations of
prenatal beings to those done for the benefit of the subject or the
mother, they are consistent with presently applied standards. In fact,
those standards would probably permit some relaxation of the limita-
tion when the subject is a fetus of very limited development. On the
other hand, to the extent that the regulations distinguish between
abortuses and conceptuses in permitting experimentation on the former
which would be impermissible on the latter, they fail to conform to
appropriate ethical standards and should be modified to treat all
fetuses of the same development similarly.
112. Making the propriety of experimentation turn on whether the decision to abort Is
irrevocable, see HEW Proposals, 39 Fed. Reg. 37993 (1974) completely neglects the dignity
consequences to the abortus-subject.
